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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers
Gretchen Zmitrovich
I. INTRODUCTION

In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers,1 [hereinafter the SWANCC case or SWANCC decision] the
United States Supreme Court held that the United States Army Corps of
Engineers' [hereinafter the Corps] rule extending the definition of "navigable
waters" under the Clean Water Act2 [hereinafter the CWA] to include intrastate
waters used as a habitat by migratory birds exceeded the authority granted to the
Corps under the CWA.
The purpose of this casenote is to examine the Supreme Court's opinion, its
implications on wetlands regulation, the response of the states to the decision,
and the need for the remainder of the states, including Mississippi, to enact state
statutes to provide protection for isolated, nonnavigable wetlands. Part II of this
casenote examines the underlying facts of the SWANCC case. Part III provides a
brief history of the CWA, the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands pursuant to the
CWA, and the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the extent of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause. Part IV details the holdings of both the
majority and dissenting opinions in the SWANCC decision. Part V analyzes the
impact of the decision on isolated, nonnavigable waters with a discussion of the
status of wetland protection at the state level and the need for states to take
immediate action in enacting their own statutes to protect these vulnerable wetlands.
II. FACTS
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County [hereinafter SWANCC]
is a consortium of twenty-three suburban Chicago cities and villages, which
selected a 533-acre parcel of land as a disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid
waste.' Since being abandoned around 1960, part of the site, which had been
previously used as a sand and gravel pit, had developed into a forest with remnant excavation trenches that had evolved into permanent and seasonal ponds.4

1. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
3. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-63; see also Timothy S. Bishop et al., One for the Birds: The Corps of
Engineers' "MigratoryBird Rule, " at http://www.appellate.net/articles/migrabirdrule.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,
2004).

4. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
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These ponds were of varying sizes (ranging from under one-tenth of an acre to
several acres) and varying depths (ranging from several inches to several feet).'
SWANCC obtained the necessary permits from both Cook County and the
State of Illinois, and because SWANCC's plans called for filling in some of the
ponds, it contacted the Corps to determine if a federal landfill permit was
required under section 404(a) of the CWA. 6 Initially, the Corps concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction over the proposed disposal site "because it contained no 'wetlands,' or areas which support 'vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions."' 7 However, after being informed by the Illinois Nature
Preserves Commission that a number of migratory bird species had been seen at
the proposed site, the Corps reconsidered its previous jurisdictional decision.8
The Corps found that approximately 121 bird species had been observed at the
proposed site and asserted jurisdiction over the site pursuant to the "Migratory
Bird Rule."9 The Corps determined that the ponds were "waters of the United
States" because "'(1) the proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel mining
operation; (2) the water areas and spoil piles had developed a natural character;
and (3) the water areas are used as habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross
state lines."' 10
SWANCC made several proposals to mitigate any negative effects of the
likely displacement of the migratory birds.11 SWANCC's proposals received the
necessary local and state approval, but the Corps refused to issue a section
404(a) permit. 2 The Corps determined that SWANCC
had not established that its proposal was the "least environmentally damaging, most practicable alternative" for disposal of
nonhazardous solid waste; that SWANCC's failure to set aside
sufficient funds to remediate leaks posed an "unacceptable risk
to the public's drinking water supply"; and that the impact of the
project upon area-sensitive species was "unmitigatable since a
landfill surface cannot be redeveloped into a forested habitat." 3
SWANCC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois challenging the Corps' jurisdiction over the proposed site and
the merits of the Corps' denial of the section 404(a) permit.14 The district court
granted summary judgment to the Corps on the jurisdictional issue. 5 After drop-

5. Id.
6. Id. Section 404(a) is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
7. Id. at 164 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1999)).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164-65 (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District, Dept. of Army
Permit Evaluation and Decision Document, Lodging of Petitioner, Tab No. 1,p. 6).
11. Id. at 165.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District, Dept. of Army Permit Evaluation and
Decision Document, Lodging of Petitioner, Tab No. 1,p. 87.).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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ping its challenge on the merits of the denial, SWANCC appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.16
On appeal, SWANCC had two arguments: (1) the Corps had exceeded its
authority under the CWA by asserting jurisdiction over "nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters based upon the presence of migratory birds" and (2) in the alternative, Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause of the United States
17
Constitution to grant the Corps such jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling." The court held that
Congress did have power to grant such jurisdiction to the Corps based upon the
"cumulative impact doctrine." 9 The court noted that the "cumulative impact
doctrine" applies when "a single activity that itself has no discernible effect on
interstate commerce may still be regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of
activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce."20 The aggregate effect
of SWANCC's filling of the ponds at the proposed site and its "'destruction of
the natural habitat of migratory birds,"' according to the court, "was substantial
because each year millions of Americans cross state lines and spend over a billion dollars to hunt and observe migratory birds."2 The court also held that the
Corps' "Migratory Bird Rule" was a "reasonable interpretation of the [CWA]"
because "the CWA reaches as many waters as the Commerce Clause allows."22
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on both issues: may the
provisions of section 404(a) be extended to the ponds at the proposed site, and if
so, can Congress grant jurisdiction to the Corps over these ponds consistent with
the Commerce Clause.22 The Court held that section 404(a) cannot be extended
to the ponds at the proposed site and therefore did not answer the constitutional
question. 4
III.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

A. The CWA and the Corps'Jurisdictionover Navigable Waters
1. Creation of the CWA
In 1948, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to
"enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national
policy for the prevention, control and abatement of water pollution."2 After its

16. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165.
17. Id. at 165-66.
18. Id. at 166.
19. Id. (quoting Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d
845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166 (quoting SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 851-52).
Id. at 162.
Id.
U.S. EPA, The Challenge of the Environment: A Primer on EPA's Statutory Authority, at

http://www.epa.gov/historyl/topics/fwpca/05.htm (last updated June 11, 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
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enactment, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act went through several
amendments, each expanding federal authority.26 During this time, the federal
authority for implementing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act went
through several reorganizations and restructurings. The result was a "hodgepodge of law" that was difficult to implement." Thus, Congress enacted amendments entitled the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972."" The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 put the
sole authority for water pollution control in the Administrator of the EPA. 9
The stated purpose of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 was to restore and maintain chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."0 On December 15, 1977, Congress passed amendments
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act entitled "The Clean Water Act";
thereafter, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and its numerous amendments became known as the CWA. 1 Under the CWA, the Administrator of the
EPA and the Secretary of the Army, through the Chief Engineers of the Army
Corps of Engineers, have joint responsibility for issuing and enforcing permits
for the dredging and/or filling of "navigable waters."32
2. The Corps' Authority under Section 404(a)
Section 404(a) of the CWA grants the Corps the authority to issue permits
for discharges of "dredged or fill material into the navigable waters.""3 The
waters" as "the waters of the United States, including
CWA defines "navigable
34
seas.
territorial
the
When the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were
enacted, the Corps construed the term "navigable waters" literally, and a permit
was only required for dredge and fill operations that took place in waters that
were actually navigable." Then on July 25, 1975, the Corps issued interim regulations to expand the definition of "navigable waters" to "include not only actually navigable waters, but also tributaries of navigable waters, interstate waters
and their tributaries, and even nonnavigable waters (in the traditional sense) provided their use or misuse could affect interstate commerce."36 In those interim
regulations, the Corps included freshwater wetlands adjacent to other covered
37
waters within its jurisdiction.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
31. Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Non-adjacent Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 615, 622 (1989).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1342, 1344 (2000).
33. Id. at § 1344(a).
34. Id. at § 1362(7).
35. Geltman, supra note 31, at 621.
36. Id. (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320-21 (1975)).
37. Geltman, supra note 31, at 621-22. The Corps' regulations currently define the term "waters of the
United States" to include "waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudfiats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
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On July 19, 1977, the Corps issued its final regulations of "navigable
waters."' The Corps redefined "wetlands" to include "areas that are inundated
or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."39 The regulations further stated that "[w]etlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar
areas."" The result of these regulations was that the Corps' jurisdiction was
expanded; to be within the Corps' jurisdiction, wetlands no longer had to be
periodically inundated or freshwater wetlands.41
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,42 the United States
Supreme Court was asked to determine a similar issue as in the SWANCC case.
In Riverside Bayview Homes, the issue was whether the CWA and regulations
issued by the Corps in 1977 extended the Corps' jurisdiction to wetlands (not
''navigable waters" in themselves) adjacent to navigable bodies of water and
their tributaries.43 Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. owned eighty acres of lowlying marshy land near the shores of a lake in Michigan.44 In preparation for
construction of a housing development, Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. began to
fill part of-the marshy land.45 The Corps asserted jurisdiction over these marshy
lands as "adjacent wetlands."46 The Corps filed suit against Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. to enjoin them from filling in the marshy lands without first obtaining a permit.4 " The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan granted the injunction, and on appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed holding that the Corps' regulations did not
cover "wetlands that were not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at
a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation."48
The Supreme Court reversed holding that the marshy lands were covered by
the Corps' jurisdiction.49 The Court determined that the marshy lands were
"wetlands" pursuant to the Corps' definition because they did contain vegetation
that grows in saturated soils, the soils were saturated by ground water, and the
plain language of the regulations required inundation by flooding or saturation
by ground water.5" The Court also determined that the marshy lands were adjacent to a body of navigable water. 1

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Geitman, supra note 31, at 622.

Id.
Id.
Id.
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 125.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 129-31.
Id. at 131.
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The Court further held that the Corps' jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands as
"waters of the United States" was a reasonable construction of section 404(a) of
the CWA."2 The Court determined that the fact that the marshy lands were not in
themselves navigable did not render the Corps' jurisdiction void for two reasons.
First, the Court noted that the term "navigable" was of "limited import," because
Congress intended "to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term." 3 Second, the Court noted that the goal of the
CWA was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters" and focused on the Corps' technical expertise in
determining that "wetlands adjacent to navigable waters do as a general matter
play a key role in protecting and enhancing water quality."54 In further support
of the Corps' authority under section 404(a) to regulate the marshy lands, the
Court noted that Congress acquiesced in the Corps' definition of "waters of the
55
United States" when it refused to adopt legislation that narrowed the definition.
Although the Court did find that the Corps had jurisdiction over nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water, the Court did not "express
any opinion" on whether the Corps could "regulate discharges
of fill material
56
into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.
3. The Migratory Bird Rule
The Corps issued what is commonly referred to as the Migratory Bird Rule
in the preamble of its 1986 regulations "in an attempt to 'clarify' the reach of its
jurisdiction."57 By issuing the Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps attempted to
extend its jurisdiction over "navigable waters" to any waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treatises; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered
species; or
58
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Thus, under the Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps' authority under section 404(a)
extended to "nonnavigable, [hydrologically] isolated, intrastate waters.""
In Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United States EPA.,60 the United

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was asked to determine the
validity of the Migratory Bird Rule as an exercise of the Corps' authority in reg52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 133 (citing S. CONE. REP. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776).
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132, 133.
Id. at 135-39.
Id. at 131, n.8.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986)).
51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166.
999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
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ulating the "waters of the United States." The court was confronted with
whether the Corps had jurisdiction over an area of property, "Area A," owned by
Hoffman Homes, Inc. that covered approximately one acre and had been filled
by Hoffman Homes, Inc. The Corps noticed the filling and issued a cease and
desist order for Area A." Hoffman Homes, Inc. applied for an after-the-fact permit, but the EPA, exercising its joint authority under the CWA, objected to
Hoffman Homes, Inc.'s plans to mitigate the damage caused by the filling of
Area A. 2 The EPA assessed a fine against Hoffman Homes, Inc. for the filling
of Area A without a permit. 3 In assessing the fine, the EPA's Chief Judicial
Officer found that while there was no direct evidence Area A had been used by
migratory birds, the EPA had adequately demonstrated that "Area A provided 'a
suitable habitat for migratory birds before it was filled in."64
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the EPA had not presented sufficient evidence that migratory birds actually used Area A which would have
allowed the Corps to assert jurisdiction over the property based on the Migratory
Bird Rule.6" However, the court did uphold the validity of the Migratory Bird
Rule by agreeing with the EPA that "it is reasonable to interpret the regulation as
allowing migratory birds to be that connection between a wetland and interstate
commerce."6 The court further held, "Throughout North America, millions of
people annually spend more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and
observing migratory birds. Yet the cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced populations of many bird species and consequently the ability of people to hunt,
trap, and observe those birds.""
Prior to the time of the SWANCC decision, only one other federal court of
appeals had upheld the Migratory Bird Rule as a valid exercise of Corps authority.68 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Leslie Salt Co.
v. United States, 9 was confronted with a case involving a 153-acre piece of
undeveloped land owned by Leslie Salt. Leslie Salt's predecessor had excavated
pits on the property to deposit calcium chloride and for use in crystallizing salt.7
The use of the pits ended in 1959, but the pits remained and developed into a
winter and spring habitat for migratory birds.71 In 1985, Leslie Salt began digging a ditch and pond on the land to drain it. The Corps became aware of this
activity and issued a cease and desist order pursuant to section 404. 72

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259 (quoting EPA's Final Decision at 2).
Id. at 262.
Hoffman Homes Inc., 999 F.2d at 261.
Id.
Bishop et al., supra note 3, at 10,633.
896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
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Leslie Salt filed suit. The United States District Court of the Northern
District of California held that the Corps did not have jurisdiction over the property, and the United States appealed to the Ninth Circuit.73 The Ninth Circuit
held that the "commerce clause power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad
enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide
habitat to migratory birds and endangered species."'74 The court then remanded
to the district court to determine if the property met "the requisite connections to
interstate commerce."" On remand, the district court found that the property
was subject to the Corps' jurisdiction.76 Cargill, Inc., the successor to Leslie
Salt, appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit.77 While noting
that "[t]he migratory bird rule certainly tests the limits of Congress's commerce
powers and, some would argue, the bounds of reason," the Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court's decision.7 8
Cargill, Inc. appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court, and
the Court denied certiorari on October 30, 1995." 9 In a dissenting opinion to the
denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas noted that "the Corps' regulations are based
on the assumption, improper in my opinion, that the self-propelled flight of birds
across state lines creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a habitat for
migratory birds."8 Justice Thomas also noted that "the Corps' expansive interpretation of its regulatory powers under the Clean Water Act... likely stretches
Congress' Commerce Clause powers beyond the breaking point."81
B. The Commerce Clause and Recent JudicialLimitations on Its Use

Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution delegates to Congress
the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes. '02 The United States Supreme Court first
defined the nature of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause by defining
"commerce" expansively in Gibbons v. Ogden as something more than just traffic; "it is intercourse. "83 The Court did hold, however, that Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause was not unlimited; as comprehensive as the word
"among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns
more states than one.84 However, for nearly a century after Gibbons, the Court
73. Id.
74. Id. at 360.
75. Leslie Salt Co., 896 F.2d at 360.
76. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 478, 480 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (referring to the evidence
found in the United States Memorandum on Remand). See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392
(9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the "Memorandum states that some 55 species of migratory birds use the seasonally
ponded areas as habitat").
77. Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1390.
78. Id. at 1396.
79. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
80. Id. at 958 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. 22 U.S. 1, 189-90 (1824).
84. Id. at 194-195.
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rejected the reasoning in Gibbons, narrowly defined Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause, and found that it did not apply to the internal commerce
of the states.85 Then beginning in 1937 with the Court's decision in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.," the Court began to expand Congress's authority
87
under the Commerce Clause.
However, in United States v. Lopez, 8 for the first time in decades, the
United States Supreme Court held that a congressional act was invalid as
exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause. For approximately sixty years
prior to Lopez, the Court had upheld congressional acts if the activity regulated
by the act had "substantial effects" on commerce, even if the effects were indirect.89 In Lopez, the Court struck down a law regulating the possession of guns
near school zones.9 " The Court held that Congress may regulate three categories
of activities under its commerce power: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate
commerce," (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and (3) "those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."91 Under this framework,
the Court held that the gun law could not be upheld or struck down based on
either of the first two categories.92
For the analysis under the third category, the Court separated activities into
two groups: economic activities and noneconomic activities.9" The Court held
"[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained."94 In striking down the gun law, the
Court further held that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." 95 The Court also discussed the lack of
legislative findings of the effect of the legislation on interstate commerce.96 The
Court noted that while ordinarily Congress need not make such findings, such
findings may have helped the Court "evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce." 97
Five years later, the Supreme Court addressed another Commerce Clause
challenge in United States v. Morrison8 In 1994, Congress passed the Violence
85. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995).
86. 301 U.S. 1(1937).
87. See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (holding "[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end."); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (holding "[t]hat appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial.") (emphasis added).
88. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
89. Id. at 560.
90. Id. at551.
91. Id. at 558-59.
92. Id. at 559.

93. Id. at 560-61.
94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
95. Id. at 567.
96. Id. at 563.

97. Id.
98. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence. 9 The Court held that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.""1 ' Unlike the gun control
legislation at issue in Lopez, the Violence Against Women Act contained
"numerous findings" of a connection between violence against women and interstate commerce."' However, the Court refused to hold these findings conclusive
on whether the activity substantially affects interstate commerce and held
"whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
1 2 The
Court.""
Court struck down the Act as exceeding Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause and held "[w]e accordingly reject the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." ' 3
IV. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers
A. The Majority Opinion

1. The Meaning of Section 404(a)'s "Navigable Waters"
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. The majority first turned to
the Court's opinion in Riverside Bayview Homes."4 While observing that the
Court in Riverside Bayview Homes did find that the Corps had jurisdiction over
some waters that were not navigable but were adjacent to navigable waters, the
Court noted, "It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable
waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.10 s
The Court declined to conclude that the plain language of the CWA gave the
Corps jurisdiction over ponds not adjacent to open water.1 06
Next, the Court turned to the legislative history of the section 404(a).0 7 The
Court noted that the Corps' original interpretation of their authority under section 404(a), two years after its enactment, was inconsistent with its position in
the present case. 0 8 As noted by the Court, the Corps' original regulations in
1974 defined "navigable waters" as those "subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide" and/or those that can be used for "interstate or foreign commerce." ' 9
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 605.
Id. at613.
Id. at 614.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 617.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 167.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)).
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Rejecting the contention by the Corps that Congress intended "that the term navigable waters be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation," the
Court found that there was nothing in the legislative history to indicate "that
Congress intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation."110
2. Congress's Acquiescence to the Corps' Interpretation of Section 404(a)
The Corps asserted that even if Congress did not intend to give it authority
over nonnavigable waters that are not adjacent to covered bodies in 1972 when it
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, it "approved the more expansive definition of 'navigable waters' found in the Corps' 1977 regulations. 11
The Corps argued that when Congress considered the 1977 amendments to the
CWA, it knew of the Corps' 1977 regulations in which "waters of the United
States" was defined to include among other things "isolated wetlands and
lakes.1 12 In particular, the Corps pointed to two legislative actions: a failed
House bill that limited "navigable waters" to only those that could be used "to
transport interstate or foreign commerce" ' and an extension of the EPA's jurisdiction under section 404(g) to "waters 'other than' traditional 'navigable
waters." 4
The Court dismissed the Corps' assertions regarding the failed House bill as
evidence of congressional acquiescence, explaining that "[a] bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others. " The Court noted that the attenuation between the actions or inactions of
the Congress passing the 1977 amendments and the intent of the Congress originally passing the CWA was considerable. 6 In addition, the Court concluded
that the legislative history did not show "that the House bill was proposed in
response to the Corps' claim of jurisdiction over nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters or that its failure indicated congressional acquiescence to such
1' 17
jurisdiction."
The Court also dismissed the Corps' argument concerning section 404(g)(1)
as indicating that Congress acquiesced to the Corps' jurisdiction over
SWANCC's ponds because section 404(g)(1) does not conclusively dictate the
meaning of the term "waters" in other parts of the CWA.1 8 In addressing its
statement in Riverside Bayview Homes that the term "navigable" was of limited
import, the Court noted that "it is one thing to give a word limited effect and
quite another to give it no effect whatever." 1 9 Thus, the Court declined the
110. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3 (quoting S.CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972), reprintedin 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3822 (internal quotations omitted)).
111. Id. at 168.
112. Id. at 168-69.
113. Id.at 169 (quoting 123 CONG. REc. 10420, 10434 (1977)).
114. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)).
115. Id. at 170.
116. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at170.
117. Id. at 171.
118. Id.
119. Id.at176.
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Corps' "invitation to take what they see as the next ineluctable step after
Riverside Bayview Homes: holding that isolated ponds, some only seasonal,
wholly located within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)'s definition of
'navigable waters' because they serve as habitat for migratory birds.""'
3. The Chevron/Federalism Argument
The Corps' final argument was that since Congress did not address the question of whether section 404(a) extended the Corps' jurisdiction to "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters, and that, therefore, [the Court] should give deference to the 'Migratory Bird Rule."'121 The Court refused to defer to the Corps'
interpretation because it found section 404(a) to be clear. 22 More importantly,
the Court noted that even if section 404(a) was not clear, it would not defer to
the Corps' interpretation. 23
In not deferring, the Court held that "[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear
indication that Congress intended that result." '24 The Court's requirement of
such an indication "stems from [its] prudential desire not to needlessly reach
constitutional issues and [its] assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority."' 25 The Court also noted that the concern about Congress's
intent "is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federalstate framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state
power."' 26
The Corps argued that the Migratory Bird Rule is "within Congress' power
to regulate intrastate activities that 'substantially affect' interstate commerce"
because millions of people spend large sums of money on recreational activities
related to migratory birds.'27 However, the Court recently, in Lopez 2 ' and
Morrison,'29 has reaffirmed that Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause is not unlimited. 3 Thus, in order to determine if the grant of jurisdiction
to the Corps under the Migratory Bird Rule to "nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate" waters exceeded Congress's authority, the Court would have to
3
address "significant constitutional questions.' '
120. Id. at 171-72.
121. Id. at 172 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984)).
122. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 172-73 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
125. Id. at 173 (citing Edward, 485 U.S. 568).
126. Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
127. Id.
128. 514U.S. 549.
129. 529 U.S. 598.
130. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
131. Id. at 174.
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Although these significant constitutional questions are raised by the Corps'
argument (thus, "invok[ing] the outer limits of Congress' power"), the Court
could "find nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress that it intended
'
§ 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit."132
The Court noted that the
Corps' interpretation "would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use" and thus alter "the federal-state framework" if the Corps was allowed to exercise federal jurisdiction
over SWANCC's land. 3 Thus, the Court opted to "read the statute as written to
avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the
Corps'] interpretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative defer34
ence."'
B. Dissent's Opinion
1. The Meaning of Section 404(a)'s "Navigable Waters"
Justice Stevens delivered the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer. 3 While rejecting that the term "navigable waters" in the
CWA limited the Corps' jurisdiction to those waters that were indeed navigable,
the dissent held that the term "operates in the statute as a shorthand for 'waters
over which federal authority may properly be asserted."' 36 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent discussed the history of federal water pollution control regulations, the definition of "navigable waters" in section 502(7) of the CWA, and
the legislative history of the CWA, finding that in all three, the focus of the
13 7
CWA is on clean water, not navigation.
First, the dissent addressed the mission of the Corps under the CWA, which
includes "protecting the quality of our Nation's waters for [a]esthetic, health,
recreational, and environmental uses." 3 s The dissent compared this mission
with the narrower mission of the Corps under the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899 which was to "regulat[e] discharges into certain
waters in order to protect their use as highways for transportation of interstate
and foreign commerce." '39 The dissent also compared the CWA's purpose of
being a "truly comprehensive federal water pollution legislation"' (and more
specifically, section 404's purpose of being a "pollution control measure" 41 ) to
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act's purpose of guaranteeing "the main'
tenance of navigability."142
The dissent concluded that the scope of the Corps'
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) ("[Rlegulation of land use [is] a
function traditionally performed by local governments.")).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 174 (dissenting opinion).
136. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 182.
137. Id. at 177-82.
138. Id. at 175.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 179.
141. Id.
142. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179.
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jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act logically was limited only to navigable waters. 43 However, since the Corps' mission under the
CWA and the purpose of the CWA was broader and more comprehensive, the
scope of its jurisdiction was broader and more comprehensive, extending to a
definition of "waters of the United States"-a definition which does not require
"actual or potential navigability."1 4'
The dissent illustrated this shift from jurisdiction of navigable waters only to
any "waters of the United States" by tracing the evolution of federal water pollution control regulations starting with efforts in the nineteenth century aimed at
"'promot[ing] water transportation and commerce."' 5 The dissent then outlined
a string of federal regulations that focused on navigability including the various
Rivers and Harbors Acts. 46 Next, the dissent noted "the goals of federal water
regulation began to shift away from an exclusive focus on protecting navigability and toward a concern for preventing environmental degradation" during the
mid-twentieth century. 47 The dissent asserted that the passage of the CWA in
1972 was the climax of this shift. 48
Second, the dissent held that while the CWA did use the term "navigable
waters" from the Rivers and Harbors Acts and earlier versions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, the CWA broadened its definition to all "waters of
'
the United States."149
In particular, the word "navigable" was deleted from the
definition of "navigable waters" found in the version of the CWA adopted by the
House of Representatives.'
2. Congress's Acquiescence to the Corps' Interpretation of Section 404(a)
The dissent held that regulations promulgated after the passage of the CWA
and the acquiescence of Congress in these regulations enlarged the Corps' jurisdiction. 51 The dissent focused on the 1975 regulations issued by the Corps that
defined "the waters of the United States" to include "nonnavigable intrastate
waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce."12 The Corps
issued its final version of these regulations in 1977; under these regulations, the
Corps' jurisdiction clearly covered "'isolated lakes and wetlands, intermittent
streams, prairie potholes, and other waters that are not part of a tributary system
to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United States, the degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce."" 53 The dissent noted
the opposition to these regulations among members of Congress, which lead to a
143. Id. at 175.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 177 (quoting Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Callfor a National Water Policy and
the Evolution ofFederalJurisdictionover Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REv. 873, 877 (1993)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 178 (citing Kalen, supra note 145, at 877-89 n. 30).
148. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179.
149. Id. at 180.
150. Id. at 180-81 (citing H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. § 502(8) (1971)).
151. Id. at 183-91.
152. Id. at 184.
153. Id. (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,127 (1977), as amended, 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1977)).
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failed effort to limit the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404 to those "waters
that are used, or by reasonable improvement could be used, as a means
to trans'1 4
port interstate or foreign commerce and their adjacent wetlands."
3. The Chevron/Federalism Argument
Finding that the Corps' interpretation did not "encroac[h] upon 'traditional
state power' over land use, the dissent held that the Court should have given deference to the Corps under Chevron. 5' The dissent noted that the CWA was not a
land-use code, but rather it was "a paradigm of environmental regulation" that is
"an accepted exercise of federal power."15 6 In support of its assertion that the
CWA does not impinge upon state power, the dissent noted that while land use
planning, a traditional state function, is used to dictate particular uses for land,
environmental regulation "requires only that, however the land is used, damage
'
to the environment is kept within prescribed limits."157
The dissent found that
the Corps' interpretation was "manifestly reasonable and therefore entitled to
deference.""1 8
V.Analysis
Although the Court invalidated the Migratory Bird Rule in SWANCC, it
failed to define precisely what "waters" the Corps has the authority to regulate
under section 404(a). Obviously from the decisions in Riverview and SWANCC,
the Corps still has jurisdiction over "navigable waters" and wetlands "adjacent"
to navigable waters. 5 The Corps may also still have jurisdiction over wetlands
that have a "significant nexus" to "navigable waters.""16 If the dissent's interpretation of the Court's decision is correct, the Corps still has jurisdiction over
"actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each.""16
However, the majority never specifically addressed the Corps' jurisdiction over
tributaries of navigable waters or those wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters.
The ultimate effect of the Court's decision on isolated wetlands will mainly
depend on future administrative and judicial definitions of "adjacent," "significant nexus," and possibly "tributaries." Based on some estimates, if the Corps
only has jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters and their immediately
adjacent wetlands, then only 20% of the wetlands in the United States would be
under federal regulation. 62 If a more inclusive definition of "adjacent" (such as
154. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 185.
155. Id. at 191-92.
156. Id. at 191 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981)).
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 192.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.

161. Id. at 177.
162. Jon Kusler, Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc., The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation
of Wetlands, availableat http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/aswm-int.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
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the 100 year floodplain) is adopted by the Corps and upheld by subsequent court
decisions, the total wetlands subject to federal regulation may range from 30%
to 40% of the United States' total wetlands. 161 If the Corps' jurisdiction extended to both navigable waters (and their adjacent wetlands) and to the tributaries of
navigable waters (and their adjacent wetlands), then between 40% and 60% of
the United States' wetlands would be subject to federal regulation.1 64 Of course,
even the definition of "tributary" could be varying, so potentially more than 60%
of the total wetlands could be under the Corps' jurisdiction. 6 '
What is as equally clear as the Corps' ability to assert jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands is that the Corps does not
have jurisdiction over purely isolated wetlands based on the Migratory Bird
Rule. Thus, protection of these previously federally protected isolated wetlands
is now in the hands of the states. The impact of this loss of federal jurisdiction
could potentially be devastating to some parts of the United States, particularly
Mississippi. While the number of purely isolated wetlands found in the United
States is impossible to calculate accurately, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service has assessed isolated wetlands in selected regions of the United States.
The study area chosen for Mississippi was a 157,000-acre plot of land around
Holly Springs, Mississippi. 6 ' Of the total acres in the plot, 6.5% are wetlands.'
Of these wetlands, between 5.3% and 5.7% are isolated wetlands. 66 When
assessing these numbers, it is important to realize that the Service surveyed one
small area of Mississippi, and as some argue, "[e]ven if SWANCC results in
only one percent loss of America's wetlands, the decision would cause more
wetlands to be destroyed than were lost in the past decade."' 66
Do the states adequately protect these vulnerable wetlands? States can protect their wetlands using procedural mechanisms found in the CWA and/or by
enacting state statutes. One of stated policies of Congress in enacting the CWA
was "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.' 17 To further this policy,
under section 401 of the CWA, a section 404 permit cannot be issued unless a
section 401 water quality certification is obtained from or waived by the applica-

163. Id.
164. Id. This interpretation was advanced by the dissent in SWANCC and is the broadest interpretation.
165. Id.
166. R.W. Tiner et al., U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, GeographicallyIsolated
Wetlands: A Preliminary Assessment of Their Characteristicsand Status in Selected Areas of the United
States, 177 availableat http://wetlands.fws.gov/Pubs-Reports/isolated/report.htm (June 2002).
167. Id.
168. Id. The Fish and Wildlife Service defines "isolated wetlands" as "wetlands with no apparent surface
water connection to perennial rivers and streams, estuaries, or the ocean." Id. at 83.
169. Kusler, supra note 162; see also Mark Petrie et al., Ducks Unlimited, Inc., The SWANCC Decision:
Implicationfor Wetlands and Waterfowl, 43 available at http://www.ducks.org/conservation/404_report.asp
(Sept. 2001); U.S. EPA, Status and Trends, at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/wetlands/vital/status.html (last
updated Jan. 17, 2003) (noting in 1997, lower forty-eight states had 105.5 million acres of wetlands with
58,500 acres lost per year between the years of 1986 and 1997).
170. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
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ble state.171 States can veto the issuance of the permit or add restrictions into the
permit using this mechanism. 72 The majority of states use the section 401 certification requirement to regulate wetlands within their borders. 73 However, since the
section 401 certification mechanism is directly tied to the section 404 permit, states
using this mechanism do not provide adequate protection to isolated wetlands.
Only eighteen states currently provide extensive protection for isolated wetlands using state statutes:174 Connecticut,17 Florida,176 Maine, 77 Maryland,178
Massachusetts, 79 Michigan, 8 ' Minnesota, 81 New Hampshire,8 2 New Jersey, 83
171. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
172. Id.
173. Kusler, supra note 162.
174. See also Association of State Wetland Managers, State Wetland Programs: State Wetland Protection
Statutes, at http://www.aswm.org/swp/states.htm (last updated Mar. 24, 2003). Four of these states, Maine,
New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont, urged the Supreme Court to affirm the Seventh Circuit's decision despite
having state statutes that provide extensive protection to isolated wetlands. See Brief of the States of
California, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 21, 23-24, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-11178) (noting that "federal wetlands regulation benefits the States
and complements their own wetland protection programs" and "there is a compelling need for federal wetland
regulation because of the regulatory void that would exist in its absence.")
175. Connecticut's "Inland Water Resources Program" is authorized by the Inland Wetlands and
Watercourse Act and implemented by municipal wetlands agencies and the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-36 to -45 (1995); Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection, Inland Water Resources Program-Fact Sheets and Information,
http://dep.state.ct.us/wtr/wetlands/inland.htm (last update Apr. 15, 1998).
176. Florida's "Environmental Resource Permitting Program" is authorized by statute and implemented by
several water management districts and the Florida Department of Envirormental Protection. See FLA. STAT.
ch. 373.403-.443 (2000); Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Submerged Land and
Environmental Resources (SLER) Program, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/wetlands/index.htm (last updated
Aug. 21, 2003).
177. Maine's wetlands protection program is authorized by the Natural Resources Protection Act and implemented by the Maine Department of Environmental Protection. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-A to
480-AA (2001); Maine Department of Environmental Protection, Land & Water Quality--Natural Resources
Protection Act, http://www.state.me.us/dep/blwq/docstand/nrpapage.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
178. Maryland's "Wetlands and Waterways Program" is authorized by statute and implemented by the
Maryland Department of the Environment. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 5-901 to 5-911 (2002); Maryland
Department of the Environment, Wetlands and Waterways Program, http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs
/WaterPrograms/WetlandsWaterways/index.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
179. Massachusetts's "Wetlands Program" is authorized by the Wetlands Protection Act and the Inland and
Coastal Wetlands Restriction Acts and implemented by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130 § 105 (2002); Id. at ch. 131, § 40; Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection, Wetlands, http://www.state.ma.us/dep/brp/ww/rpwwhome.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2004).
180. Michigan's wetlands protection program is authorized by the Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act and implemented by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 324.30301-.30323 (2003); Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Wetlands Protection,
http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,l 607,7-135-3313_3687---,00.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
181. Minnesota's wetlands protection program is authorized by the Wetlands Conservation Act and implemented by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources. See MNN. STAT. §§ 103G.222-.2372 (2003);
Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources, Wetlands Conversation Act Manual, available at
http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/wetlands/wcamanual/wcamanual02.pdf (Jan. 4, 2004).
182. New Hampshire's wetlands protection program is authorized by statute and implemented by the New
Hampshire Department of Environmental Services. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 482-A:l to 482-A:27
(2002); New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, Water Division Wetlands Bureau,
http://www.des.state.nh.us/wetlands/ (last updated Mar. 25, 2004).
183. New Jersey's "Freshwater Wetlands Program" is authorized by the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act
and implemented by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B1 to 13:9B-30 (West 2003); New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Land Use Regulation
Program, http://www.nj.gov/dep/landuse/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2004).
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' North Carolina,"'5 Ohio, s6 Oregon, 8 7 Pennsylvania, 8 Rhode
New York, 84
Island,' Vermont,' Virginia,' and Wisconsin.8 2 The majority of these states
provide protection through state statutes with implementation by a designated
state agency. However, a few of these states provide protection through a cooperative of state and local agencies. While the details of each state's program are
different, each uses a permitting process similar to that used under section
404(a). Thus, state and/or local approval is needed before commencement of
prohibited operations, such as dredging or filling, in protected wetlands.
Further, while some of the states provide comprehensive protection, a few have
significant limitations (e.g., New York's regulations do not apply to wetlands
under 12.4 acres, and Florida's regulations do not apply to wetlands located in

184. New York's wetlands protection program is authorized by the Freshwater Wetlands Act and implemented by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§
24-0101 to 24-1305 (McKinney 1997); New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, A Brief
Description of the Freshwater Wetlands Act and What It Means to Wetlands Landowners,
http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dfwmr/habitat/wetdes.htm (last revised June 17, 2003).
185. North Carolina's wetlands protection program is authorized by statute and implemented by the North
Carolina Environmental Management Commission. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.1301-.1305 (Oct.
2001); North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, WETLANDs/401 CERTIFICATION
UNIT, http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/ncwetlands/regcert.htn (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
186. Ohio's "Isolated Wetland Permit Program" is authorized by statute and implemented by the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency. Ohio was the second state, after Wisconsin, to enact regulation for the protection of isolated wetlands as a direct response to the SWANCC decision. See OH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
6111.01-.42 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 401 Certifications,Isolated
Wetlands Permits, http://www.epa.state.oh.us/dsw/401/401.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2004).
187. Oregon's "Wetlands Program" is authorized by the Wetlands Conservation Act and implemented by the
Oregon Division of State Lands. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.668-.770 (2001); Oregon Division of State
Lands, Wetlands Program,http://statelands.dsl.state.or.us/wetlandsintro.htm (last modified Feb. 9, 2004).
188. Pennsylvania's wetlands protection program is authorized by the Dam Safety and Encroachments Act,
the Clean Streams Law, and the Dam Safety and Waterway Management Rules and Regulations and implemented by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Recently, the state streamlined the permitting process by the enactment of the "State Programmatic General Permit." See 32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 693.1-.27 (West 1997); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 691.1-.8 (West 2003); 25 PA. CODE §§ 105.1.452(2003); Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Waterways, Wetlands, and Erosion
Control, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/watermgt/wc/subjects/wwec/generaU/wetiands/wetlands.htm
(last modified Oct. 17, 2003).
189. Rhode Island's "Freshwater Wetlands Program" is authorized by the Freshwater Wetlands Act and
implemented by the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-1-18
to 2-1-24 (2002); Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, Office of Water
Resources-FreshwaterWetlands, http://www.state.ri.us/dem/programs/benviron/water/permits/fresh/index.htm
(last revised Mar. 17, 2004).
190. Vermont's wetlands protection program is authorized by the 1986 Act Relating to the Regulation of
Wetlands and implemented by the Vermont Water Resources Board and the Vermont Department of
Environmental Conservation. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 905(7) (2002); Vermont Department of
Environmental Conservation, Wetlands Section, http://www.anr.state.vt.us/dec/waterq/wetlands.htm (last
updated Jan. 2004); Water Resources Board, Vermont Wetland Rules, available at http://www.state.vt.us/wtrboard/wet/wetrule2002.pdf (Jan. 1, 2002).
191. Virginia's "Water Protection Permit Program" is authorized by the Water Protection Permit Program
Regulation and implemented by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 25-210-10 to 25-210-260 (West 2001); Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Wetlands,
http://www.deq.state.va.us/wetlands/ (last updated Mar. 9, 2004).
192. Wisconsin's wetlands program is authorized by statute and implemented by the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources. Wisconsin was the first state to enact regulation for the protection of isolated wetlands
as a direct response to the SWANCC decision. See 2001 WISCONSIN ACT 6; WIs. STAT. § 281.36 (2001);
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Wisconsin Wetlands, http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/
fhp/wetlands/index.shtml (last revised Apr. 16, 2003).
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the Panhandle193).
Other states have taken action toward enacting statutes and/or revising regulations to protect isolated wetlands. Indiana has expanded its state National
Pollution Discharge and Elimination System permit program to include isolated
wetlands while it adopts new regulations.194 In October of 2002, the Southern
Environmental Law Center filed a petition with the state of South Carolina seekThe
ing to initiate rulemaking to protect South Carolina's isolated wetlands."
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control published a
Notice of Rule Drafting on December 27, 2002, seeking to amend R. 61-101,
Water Quality Certification.196 The agency issued proposed rules in 2003.197
After a public comment phase, the agency will review the proposed rules in
2004.198

The only protection afforded wetlands under Mississippi law is found in the
Coastal Wetlands Protection Act.19 9 The Coastal Wetlands Protection Act prohibits entities from engaging in a regulated activity that affects coastal wetlands
without a permit."' Regulated activities include for example, dredging or filling
coastal wetlands.0 1 Isolated wetlands in the remainder of the State are specifically excluded from protection. The Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control
Law protects Mississippi's water from pollution.0 2 However, wetlands that are
"wholly landlocked and privately owned, and which are not regulated under the
Federal Clean Water Act" are not covered in Mississippi's definition of "waters
of the state."203 Thus, while protecting isolated wetlands located in its coastal
counties, Mississippi provides no protection for isolated wetlands in the remainder of the State, leaving a gap that must be filled in order to protect Mississippi's
wetlands.
How can this gap be closed? A first step logically would involve the EPA
and the Corps defining "adjacent," "significant nexus," and "tributary." In a
joint memorandum dated January 15, 2003, the EPA and the Corps clarified their
jurisdiction based on their reading of the SWANCC case and, at the same time,
issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking [hereinafter ANPRM].204 The
EPA and the Corps grouped "waters" into four groups: (1) isolated, intrastate
waters that are nonnavigable; (2) traditional navigable waters; (3) adjacent wetlands (both those adjacent to traditional navigable waters and those adjacent to
nonnavigable waters); and (4) tributaries.2 5 The memorandum discussed the
193. Association of State Wetland Managers, State Wetland Programs: State Wetland Protection Statutes,
http://www.aswm.org/swp/states.htm (last updated Mar. 24, 2003).
194. Indiana Department of Environmental Management, NPDES Permitfor Dischargesof Dredged and Fill
Material to Isolated Waters No Longer Subject to FederalJurisdiction, http://www.in.gov/idem/water/planbr/401/wnpdes.html (last updated May 15, 2003).
195. Southern Environmental Law Center, South Carolina Wetlands Rules, at http://www.selcga.org/Cases/
sc wetlands/SCwetlands.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 49-27-71 (2002).
200. Id. § 49-27-9.
201. Id. § 49-27-5(c).
202. Id. §§ 49-17-1 to 49-17-43.
203. Id. § 49-17-5.
204. 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
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SWANCC decision, the EPA and the Corps' current regulations, and cases subsequent to the SWANCC decision that may impact their jurisdiction."' The conclusion of the agencies was that the agencies did not have CWA jurisdiction
over isolated, intrastate waters that are nonnavigable where such jurisdiction is
based on the Migratory Bird Rule."' The agencies also concluded that they still
had jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters, tributaries of navigable waters, and wetlands adjacent to
tributaries of navigable waters.0 ' The memorandum concluded by directing
field staff to make "jurisdictional and permitting decisions on a case-by-case
basis" taking into consideration the memorandum, the regulations, and "any
additional relevant court decisions. '"209
In its ANPRM, the EPA and the Corps requested input on the appropriate
definition of "waters of the United States" as well as implications of the
SWANCC decision in order to develop proposed regulations that afford "full protection to these waters through an appropriate focus of Federal and State
resources consistent with the CWA. '' 210 The public comment period on the
ANPRM ended on April 16, 2003.211 The EPA received more than 133,000
comments from citizens, organizations, and public entities.212
Unfortunately, on December 16, 2003, the EPA and the Corps announced
that they would not issue these much anticipated revised regulations.21 s In the
press release announcing their decision, the agencies promised to "continue
[their] efforts to ensure that the Corps' regulatory program is an effective, efficient and responsive as it can be. '214 But, how effective, efficient, and responsive
is a case-by-case determination made by field staff interpreting caselaw or by the
agencies' headquarters using factors as vague as use of the waters by interstate
travelers for recreation? 215 For now, the EPA and the Corps' definitions of
"adjacent," "significant nexus," and "tributary" remain unknown, and the public
is left with a costly system of challenging the Corps' decisions on a case-by-case

205. 68 Fed. Reg. at 1996-97.
206. Id. at 1995-98.
207. Id. at 1996. While admitting the two agencies no longer have any authority based on the Migratory
Bird Rule, the memorandum directs the field staff of the two agencies to "seek formal project-specific
Headquarters approval prior to asserting jurisdiction over such waters..." based on the other grounds listed in
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii). The "other grounds" include "use of the water by interstate or foreign travelers
for recreational or other purposes; the presence of fish or shellfish that could be taken and sold in interstate
commerce; use of the water for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce." Id.
208. Id. at 1998.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1991.
211. The original comment period ended March 3, 2003. The EPA, however, extended the deadline. See
U.S.
EPA, Clean Water Act Definition of "Waters of the United States,"
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/swanccnav.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2003).
212. Id.
213. U.S. EPA, EPA National News. EPA and Army Corps Issue Wetlands Division, available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf (Dec. 16, 2003).
214. Id.
215. See supra note 207.
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21
basis to determine what is and what is not included under its jurisdiction.
In the absence of revised regulations, another step to closing the gap left by
the Supreme Court would be Congress amending the CWA specifically to
include isolated wetlands under the Corps' jurisdiction. On February 27, 2003,
bi-partisan bills which are intended to do just that were introduced in both houses. 217 The proposed act, the "Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003,"
seeks to replace the term "navigable waters" with the term "waters of the United
States," and the definition of "waters of the United States" includes wetlands in
both bills. 218 However, even if Congress enacts this amendment to the CWA, the
Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003 would likely face constitutional
challenges. Based on the current state of the law, to be upheld by a court, the
Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2003 would have to establish a "significant nexus" between isolated, nonnavigable wetlands and traditional navigable waters as well as provide a clear delineation of federal and state power (so as
not to encroach "upon a traditional state power" 215 ). While the proposed amendments provide seventeen findings, the Supreme Court may still refuse to uphold
the amendments based on Lopez and its progeny.
The better solution for Mississippi and the other thirty-one states without
adequate protection for isolated wetlands would be to enact a statute to provide
such protection. Of the eighteen states that currently have protection for isolated
wetlands, two adopted their regulations in direct response to the SWANCC decision.22 Based on the wetland statutes of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Michigan, Maryland, Oregon, and other states, the Association of State Wetland
Mangers, Inc. has developed a model statute. 221 The model statute details wetland mapping and delineation requirements, permitting procedures, and penalty
and enforcement provisions. It also provides a definitional section and provides
for mitigation bank provisions and real estate tax incentives. Inherent in the
adoption of such a statute is the need for the state legislatures to provide additional funding for the state agencies charged with the permitting and enforcement
activities. By enacting state laws to regulate and protect isolated wetlands, these

216. A KeyCite search on Westlaw of the SWANCC decision restricted to dates of January 2001 to March
2004 revealed how ineffective, inefficient, and unresponsive such a case-by-case determination of the limits of
the Corps' jurisdiction over isolated wetlands has been over the past three years: eleven federal courts of
appeals decisions, twenty federal district court decisions, and two state court decisions have been handed down
interpreting or discussing the case. See also, U.S. EPA, Post-SWANCC Caselaw on "Waters of the United
States, -available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/Caselaw 12303.pdf (last updated Jan. 21, 2003) (providing a list of the myriad of caselaw that was decided between the date of the SWANCC decision and January
2003). For an example of the magnitude of costs involved in such challanges by the public and private sectors,
consider that the battle to decide whether the Corps had jurisdiction over SWANCC's wetlands took thirty million dollars in public money and thirteen years. Oral Argument, 2000 WL 1669870, (U.S. Oct. 31, 2000), Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
217. J.R. 962, 108th Cong. (2003); S.473, 108th Cong. (2003). Similar bills were introduced during the
107th Congress but died in committee. See H.R. 5194, 107th Cong. (2002); S.2780, 107th Cong. (2002).
218. H.R. 962; S. 473.
219. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175.
220. 68 Fed. Reg. at 1995; see also supra notes 183, 189.
221. Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc., Model State Wetland Statute to Close the Gap Created by
SWANCC, availableat http://www.aswm.org/swp/model-leg.pdf (Feb. 22,2001).
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states can ensure that their wetlands are protected now, before more wetlands are
destroyed.
VI. CONCLUSION

As the legislature of Maine recognized in enacting its wetlands protection
regulations, wetlands "have great scenic beauty and unique characteristics,
unsurpassed recreational, cultural, historical and environmental value of present
and future benefit."2'22 Wetlands are a vital resource to our world, and the
SWANCC decision left a gap in the protection of this resource. While the size of
the gap still remains unknown, what is known is that this Nation is losing wetlands every day that were formally provided protection under the CWA.
Wetlands are so vital to this Nation's landscape and natural heritage that states
cannot afford to wait for the federal government to act. States, including
Mississippi, must act now in passing statutes to protect these isolated, nonnavigable wetlands that have fallen into the jurisdictional gap created by the
Supreme Court.
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